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COMMENTS ON NADELMANN
MICHAEL

A. VANCE*

Thank you for Ethan A. Nadelmann's superb article' on
the folly of drug prohibition. If Daniel E. Koshland, Jr.,2 had
studied this article, he might have come to the conclusion that
the experiment he calls for has already been done. The
criminalization of drug use has already succeeded in turning a
problem into a catastrophe.
I fear that any evaluation of antidrug efforts, be it in a formal experiment or not, would emphasize the readily quantifiable end point of the number of people using drugs. A "get
tough" policy, such as that of the Bush Administration, could
be a success with that criterion.
Consider that the following have all been initiated as part
of the war on drugs: people are losing cars, homes, and even
their children without due process; casual drug users are jailed;
people suspected of absolutely nothing are subject to random
drug tests; colleges and other institutions are threatened with
heavy financial penalties unless they capitulate to federal
demands that they burden their bureaucracies with antidrug
programs; government is seeking ever greater access to personal financial records; grade school children are encouraged
to turn in drug users to authorities; and the society in general is
inundated with alarmist propaganda which grossly exaggerates
the inherent dangers of drugs.
The full implementation of such measures would indeed
diminish the use of prohibited drugs - along with any other
behavior the government wishes to suppress. The sudden
growth of state repression is symptomatic of leaders who view
people as too irresponsible or too stupid to be trusted with
liberty.
*

Department of Pharmacology, College of Pharmacy, Butler
University, Indianapolis, IN 46208.
1. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibitionin the United States: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 783 (1991).
2. Koshland, The War? Program?Experiment? on Drugs, 245 SCIENCE 1309
(1989). Koshland's article appeared together with Nadelmann's in the issue
of SCIENCE in which these comments were first published.
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C. BURNHAM**
Koshland parallels American prohibition of alcohol (19201933) with "prohibition for drugs" today. Unfortunately the
experience with alcohol prohibition he refers to appears to be
based on media impressions, which in turn are based on repeal
propaganda of the 1920s and images from old movies.
For almost a quarter of a century, historians have suggested that the national prohibition of alcohol, rather than
being "highly costly and counterproductive," as Nadelmann
asserts, was, in fact, on balance, successful.'
The old popular stereotype was that national prohibition
did not work, caused the growth of crime and other unfavorable developments, and increased the use of alcohol. Standard
historical works that take into account substantial geographical
variation have shown that in fact prohibition worked relatively
well (even laws against murder do not bring total compliance).
Per capita alcohol consumption declined to very much less than
half the preprohibition (1910) figure and remained low for
decades even after 1933, much to the distress of the newly
legalized liquor industry; indeed, the preprohibition rate was
not reached again until the early 1970s. This change occurred
despite the fact that the national government and most state
governments made only weak efforts to enforce the law. The
decrease in alcoholic psychoses - an independent index was extremely dramatic, even in "wet" states like New York (in
which the admission rate declined from about 10% to 1.9%).2
Except possibly in a local situation such as Chicago, prohibition
was incidental to crime, and the crime wave of the 1920s was
strictly a newspaper creation,3 perpetuated by the entertainment media.
Important and valid arguments support both sides of the
debate about how best to deal with drug use. The experience
with alcohol prohibition, if used, would reinforce arguments to
continue, not end, prohibiting drugs.
JOHN

**

Department of History, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH

43210-1311
1. N.H. CLARK, DELIVER Us FROM EVIL; AN
AMERICAN PROHIBITION (1976), is the standard work.

2.
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Burnham, New Perspectives on the Prohibition "Experiement" of the 1920s,

2J. Soc. HIST. 51 (1968).
3. F. L. ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE 1920s
(1964).
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BAHMAN FoZOUNI*
IRADJ SIASSIt

The cogency of Nadelmann's arguments appears to rest
more on logic than on empirical evidence. We suggest that the
reader examine an actual case of drug decriminalization Iran's prerevolution experience with "controlled" opium legalization, carried out between 1968 and 1979.' The rationale for
and objectives of that policy closely match the aims of the
decriminalization policy advocated by Nadelmann.
Briefly, after years of being unable to prevent the steady
flow of opiates from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in order to
eradicate domestic cultivation of the poppy, Iran initiated a
program of limited legalization of opium. The prime motivation for the policy was to move away from the punitive-deterrent philosophy and legalistic approach, the hallmarks of the
past "failed" policies, toward what was viewed as a "realistic"
approach to fighting the drug war. In its early stages, the program was praised by domestic and international experts alike
for its innovative approach and its potential as an alternative
paradigm for other countries with serious drug problems.2
The new policy divided Iran's drug using population into legal
("registered") and illicit groups. The former consisted of
those opium addicts who were judged "incorrigible" and therefore not amenable to treatment and rehabilitation. Included
were all opium addicts 60 years and older, as well as certain
chronically and terminally ill patients. All the remaining drug
users were classified as illicit addicts.
The core assumptions of the policy were that, by creating
"registered addicts," addicts who could legally purchase inexpensive opium to meet their drug needs, the policy would (i)
deter illicit drug traffickers from the neighboring countries; (ii)
shift resources and treatment efforts toward the younger drug
users who had a greater chance of recovery; and (iii) reduce
Center for International
Studies, University of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Formerly Director of Research, National Survey of
Mental Health and Drug Abuse Project, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Iran.
t
School of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles, CA
90024. Formerly Deputy Minister for Mental Health, Ministry of Health and
Welfare, Iran.
1. Siassi & Fozouni, Dilemmas of Iran's Opium Maintenance Program: An
Action Research for Evaluating Goal Conflicts and Policy Changes, 15 INT'L J.
ADDICT. 1127 (1980).
2. McLaughlin, The Poppy Is Not An Ordinary Flower: A Survey of Drug
Policy in Iran, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 701 (1976); McLaughlin & Quinn, Drug
Control in Iran: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 59 IOWA L. REV. 469 (1974).
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drug-induced crimes, given that many addicts would have legal
access to low-priced opium.
To meet the drug needs of the legal addicts, the government legalized the "controlled" poppy cultivation by selected
farmers and took direct charge of opium processing and distribution to these addicts. Upon registration at a local health
center, the qualified addict received monthly coupons needed
to purchase a prescribed quantity of opium at a price well
below street value from designated pharmacies and vendors.
For younger illicit addicts, the policy called for aggressive treatment and rehabilitation efforts through the expansion of
existing treatment facilities and the development of new centers throughout the country.
What were the actual consequences of this policy? First,
there was an instant rush by the elderly to register as "legal
addicts" in order to obtain the coupons needed for purchasing
low-cost legal opium. By 1976, the number of individuals officially registered as "addicts" had swelled from 20,000 to nearly
200,000, and the government estimated that the number of
individuals who were actually purchasing "legal" opium had
reached 400,000. Corruption and fraud had permeated all production stages, including cultivation, processing, and
distribution.
Meanwhile, legalization was severely undercutting the
treatment programs. The younger illicit addicts who were the
prime target of the expanded treatment efforts were receiving
most of their opium from the legal sources.'
In effect, many
legal addicts had become "pushers." The policy created an
easily accessible opium supply source for the very individuals it
had targeted for treatment and rehabilitation. The legalization
policy also produced a greater societal tolerance of opium use.
The lessons from Iran's experience with "controlled legalization" offer a telling counterexample to the advocates of
decriminalization. Undoubtedly there are strong legal and economic arguments in favor of some version of a policy of contraband drug legalization. But such arguments by themselves
cannot support the epidemiological claim that legalization
would stem the rising tide of drug abuse. There is however, an
analogy, taken from economics, that seems more fitting to drug
abuse than to material production. According to Say's Law,
"supply creates its own demand." Analysts would be well
advised to keep this dictum in mind as they contemplate alternative drug policies.
3.

Siassi & Fozouni, 4
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261 (1980).
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GABRIEL G. NAHAS*

Koshland' writes that one should observe with "scientific
detachment" the present war on drugs. Other scientific
spokesmen have stated that the scientist's main contribution to
this "war" should be in "developing medications in order to
treat addiction. '"2
Koshland also states that the Administration's program should "evaluate the problems of poverty,
minorities, and civil rights in relation to drug use;" these are
important areas, but very difficult to analyze scientifically.
Koshland states that the program "should not be compromised
by ancillary requirements relating to the general ambience of
society." There are, however, other major problems related to
the waxing and waning of the drug epidemic that might be subjected to scientific scrutiny and to quantification: the epidemic
spread of dependence-producing drugs in all layers of society,
especially among adolescents; the impact of drugs on fetal
development, brain maturation, school performance, and the
drop-out rate; the effect of drugs on industrial productivity,
absenteeism, public health (such as the spread of AIDS) and
health care delivery; and, finally, their effect on inter-American
and international policies.
Koshland says that "the country is faced today with a situation similar to prohibition" and that "[t]hose who read history
know well how ineffective the law was in that case." This historical episode is not the only one that can be invoked to predict the effectiveness of drug prohibition. After enactment of
the Harrison Act in 1914, there was an 80% reduction in
cocaine and opiate addiction, observed years later, between
1930 and 1960.s Restrictive legislations controlled availability
and consumption of these drugs in Western and Eastern
Europe during the same period. The major epidemics of
opium smoking in China 100 years ago, which affected nearly a
third of its population, were curtailed by national and international interdiction measures 4 and so.was the Japanese epidemic
of intravenous amphetamines in the 1950s.1 More recent
examples of effective restrictive legislation against heroin and
amphetamine consumption have been reported from Sweden
* Department of Anesthesiology, College of Physicians and Surgeons,
Columbia University, 630 West 168th Street, New York, NY 10032
1. See supra note 2, at 809.
2. Johnson, 3 FASEBJ. 2333 (1989).
3. D. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE (1987).
4.

W.W. WILLOUGHBY, OPIUM AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM

(1930).

5. Brill & Hirose, The Rise and Fall of a Methamphetamine Epidemic: Japan
1945-1955, 1 SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY 179 (1969).
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to Singapore.6 These social experiments, which span our century, indicate that when a popular consensus is associated with
political determination, widespread use of opiates or of major
psychostimulants may be drastically reduced. In each of these
instances, a program even more drastic than the one presented
by President Bush was implemented. Conversely the legalization of use and possession of cannabis, cocaine, and heroin in
Italy and Spain has been associated with major epidemics of the
use of these drugs. In 1988, more than 300 deaths by overdose
of cocaine and heroin were reported in Spain; 900 were
reported in Italy. These figures are higher per capita than
those reported in the United States today. These countries are
now attempting to restore interdiction measures.
The present answer to the control of illicit drug use is, to
the best of our knowledge and on the basis of massive experimentation, a policy of interdiction. However, implementation
of that policy is not a foregone conclusion in the United States
because it requires a general consensus, something that does
not seem to prevail in the scientific community. So one may
wonder whether Koshland's conclusion - "the tough experiment is under way. If it fails legalization is next" - is justified.
E. STREBEL*
I was not impressed by Nadelmann's lengthy drug legalization apologia. Given the weakness of the scientific arguments
and the significant speculative content, it should have been
printed as "opinion," with equal space for an opposing view.
Nadelmann's smoke screen of statistics and pseudo-economics skirts the real issue, which is whether we want to create,
as a society, a positive or negative attitude toward drugs. Legal
approbation for drugs sends a pro-drug message to those in
our society least able to resist them, including our children.
The use of psychoactive drugs is physically and psychologically
self-destructive as well as socially costly far in excess of the
monetary costs of enforcement. This is why we have, and
should maintain, laws against drugs.
DONALD

DAVID

R. HERSHEYt

Society lost the drug war before it started by accepting the
concept that consumption of addictive drugs for pleasurable
6. N. BEJEROT, DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG POLICY (1975).
* 6141 Encounter Row, Columbia, MD 21045
t Department of Horticulture, University of Maryland, College Park,
MD 20742-5611
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effects is okay if the drugs are alcohol; nicotine in tobacco
products; or caffeine in coffee, tea, and soft drinks. Allowing
use of some drugs but not others makes it hypocritical to
expect people to say no to drugs deemed illegal, because the
destructive effects of legal drugs are often greater than those of
some illegal drugs. For example, how many millions of lives
have been ruined by alcohol addiction versus marijuana addiction? The legal drug, alcohol, causes many more deaths and
ruined lives than the illegal drug, marijuana.
To win the drug war, we will have to accept the premise
that any use of addictive drugs is wrong, except in medical
treatment.

